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Strategic Similarity and Acquisition Outcomes at the Target:  
Evidence from China’s Beer Industry 
 
Yuping Zeng and Timothy S. Schoenecker 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This study investigates the effect of horizontal acquisitions on target firms in China’s context. We 
examine how competitive and organizational similarity jointly affect cost savings, revenue growth 
and profitability improvement at the target in horizontal acquisitions. Using a dataset containing 
information on acquired firms in China’s beer industry, we find that the way in which competitive 
similarity impacts on cost savings at the target depends on organizational similarity and the type of 
cost that is examined. Additionally, competitive dissimilarity is found to result in higher revenue 
growth and profitability improvement at the target.  
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Introduction 
 
Horizontal acquisitions (HAs) continue to be a common strategic action taken by firms to grow and 
expand (Chen and Young, 2010; UNCTAD, 2012). However, despite their popularity, HAs do not 
always lead to positive outcomes – previous studies have reported a failure rate among HAs as high as 
50 per cent (e.g. Papadakis and Thanos, 2010; Schoenberg, 2006). The high failure rate of HAs (and 
other types of acquisitions) has triggered a significant amount of research examining the determinants 
of acquisition outcomes (for reviews, see Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009). 
The extant research, however, has predominantly focused on acquisitions conducted by firms in 
developed countries, leaving acquisitions in transition economies such as China under-examined. 
This study fills this research gap by examining HAs occurring in China’s context. Furthermore, prior 
studies have focused primarily on outcomes at the acquirer or combined firm, whereas the effects of 
the HA on the target’s post-acquisition operations remain under-investigated. This study addresses 
this need by examining cost savings, revenue growth, and profitability specifically at the acquired 
firm. 
Similar to the experience of other countries transitioning from a centrally-planned to a 
market-oriented economic system, acquisitions in China usually occur against a background of 
government efforts to privatize or restructure state- or collectively- owned firms (Sheng, 1999; Xu et 
al., 2010; Zeng et al., 2013). Because most firms in transition economies are not freely tradable, the 
seller often plays a determinant role in the occurrence of acquisitions in these economies (Zeng et al., 
2013). In particular, since some key stakeholders (e.g. supervising government, labor unions, and in 
some cases, managers) will continue to be affected by the target’s operations post-acquisition, their 
selling decision (e.g. to whom to sell and under what conditions) is often driven by the target's 
long-term prospects rather than receiving the highest selling price (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007; 
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Darskuviene, 2007; Meyer, 2002; Sheng, 1999; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998). Furthermore, the 
target’s stakeholders may also impact on its post-acquisition operations. For example, due to 
concerns over employment and local economic development, the local government may restrict 
layoffs at the target and encourage the acquirer to make further investments into the target, using 
mechanisms such as government loans and tax breaks (Sheng, 1999; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 
2000).  
Given the important roles played by the target’s stakeholders and their interests in the target’s 
long-term prospects in China and other transitional economies, it is meaningful to understand factors 
impacting on the target’s post-acquisition performance. In particular, for managers of the acquiring 
firm, such an understanding may be beneficial in two ways. First, these managers may be able to 
make proposals that are attractive to suitable targets, based in part on the likelihood of a more 
promising future for their business. Secondly, they may be able to better interact with key 
stakeholders of the target during the integration process, which consequently can lead to better 
acquisition performance.  
Nevertheless, extant studies have focused primarily on the performance of the acquirer, and little 
is known about how the target performs after the acquisition, in particular in the case of HAs.1 This 
study overcomes this shortcoming by examining HA outcomes at the acquired firm. We focus on the 
effect of strategic similarity, a factor acknowledged as the most likely predictor of HA outcomes 
(Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Capron et al., 1998; Swaminathan et al., 2008).  
Generally speaking, strategic similarity refers to similarities and differences in the combining 
firms’ competitive activities as well as organizational features such as management style and 
structure. It has been posited that strategic similarity increases the potential for cost-saving synergies 
(Capron, 1999; Shelton, 1988) and facilitates the integration process (Datta, 1991; Ramaswamy, 
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1997; Swaminathan et al., 2008). Meanwhile, it has also been argued that strategic differences 
increase the likelihood of achieving revenue-enhancing synergies by combining the two firms’ 
resources (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Taking these two 
lines of thought into consideration, we examine both cost savings and revenue growth, in addition to 
profitability improvement, at the target. Additionally, we distinguish the two components of strategic 
similarity, namely competitive similarity and organizational similarity, and examine their interaction 
effect.  
Typically, an acquired firm’s post-acquisition operations cannot be studied with precision, 
because the financial results of the acquired firm are usually folded into the financial results of the 
combined entity. However, we are able to continue to track the financial performance of acquired 
firms due to a unique dataset maintained by the Chinese government that requires financial data to be 
reported at the plant level.  
Our results show that cost savings, revenue growth, and profitability improvement at the target 
are all negatively related to competitive similarity. Additionally, we find that cost savings at the target 
are greatest when both competitive and organizational dissimilarity are high. This finding may reflect 
the realities that acquired firms in China are usually state-owned or former state-owned firms that 
need significant restructuring and that strategic dissimilarity provides more opportunities for 
effective changes to take place.  
Our study contributes to our understanding of Asian business by examining how an HA target in 
China may be impacted by the level of strategic similarity between the acquirer and the target firm. 
Our results show that due to China’s background of economic transition, targets acquired by 
competitively and organizationally different acquirers are likely to perform better than those acquired 
by more similar acquirers.  
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Theoretical background  
Strategic similarity and HA outcomes 
HAs may benefit combining firms by leading to cost-saving synergies, revenue-enhancing synergies, 
or both (Barney, 2002; Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 1998; Walter and Barney, 1990). Cost savings 
may be the result of economies of scale and scope in various corporate and business-level activities 
or/and increased bargaining power over suppliers (Eckbo, 1983; Fee and Thomas, 2004; Teece, 1982). 
Growth in revenues may occur as a result of competency-enhancing synergies that lead to a stronger 
differentiated position. In turn, this may lead to increased prices or/and higher sales volume (Ahuja 
and Katila, 2001; Capron, 1999; Dranove and Shanley, 1995; Harrison et al., 1991; Saxton and 
Dollinger, 2004).   
The potential magnitude of the combination synergies and the likelihood that they will be 
captured through an effective integration process are both affected by the degree to which the acquirer 
and target are strategically similar (Harrison et al., 1991; Kusewitt, 1985). While strategic similarity 
has multiple dimensions, it can be thought of as having two components: competitive similarity and 
organizational similarity (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Competitive similarity refers to the degree to 
which the two firms’ operational and competing activities are alike. It determines the potential value 
that can be created from combining two firms and the level of integration needed to realize this 
potential (Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
Organizational similarity refers to the degree to which two firms’ organizational and cultural 
practices are alike and influences the effectiveness of the integration process (Chatterjee et al., 1992; 
Datta, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). 
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It has been agreed that organizational similarity positively affects acquisition outcomes by 
facilitating post-acquisition integration (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Empirical studies have generally 
supported this assertion (Chatterjee, 1986; Datta, 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). In contrast, 
divergent views exist regarding the outcomes of combining competitively similar and dissimilar 
firms.  
On the one hand, traditional cost-efficiency theories suggest that competitive similarity 
between combining firms provides more opportunities to exploit economies of scale and scope, and 
therefore create more potential for cost-saving synergies (Chatterjee, 1986; Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986; Ramaswamy, 1997). On the other hand, several scholars, drawing on the resource-based view 
of the firm, argue that the combination of firms with different resource configurations is more likely 
to result in private, unique and inimitable synergies, and therefore can lead to improved performance 
at the combining firms (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991). It has also been suggested that 
combining firms with different but complementary resources provides more opportunities to exploit 
revenue-enhancing synergies through product innovation and market extension (Hitt et al., 1998; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).  
These divergent perspectives indicate that the effect that competitive similarity has on the combining 
firms depends on whether cost savings or revenue growth is examined. Specifically, while combining 
competitively similar firms is likely to lead to more cost savings, the combination of competitive 
dissimilar firms will likely result in more revenue growth. Against this theoretical background, we 
examine both cost savings and revenue enhancement at the target.2  
In addition to affecting acquisition outcomes independently, organizational and competitive 
similarity may interact with each other as well. Stahl and Voigt (2008) examined the moderating 
effect that competitive similarity has on the relationship between organizational similarity and 
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acquisition outcomes. They found that organizational differences are positively related to acquisition 
performance when competitive similarity is low, but negatively related to performance when 
competitive similarity is high. Complementing this study, we examine whether the effect that 
competitive similarity has on cost savings and revenue growth at the target depends on the level of 
organizational similarity.  
 
Acquisition outcome at the target: a seller’s vs. a buyer’s perspective 
Despite the intense investigation on acquisition outcomes, few studies have examined targets 
post-acquisition. Among the few that have, the majority focus on the negative impacts of the 
acquisition (e.g. management departure, employee resistance) (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). This 
reflects the dominance of a buyer’s perspective of acquisition, where buyers are viewed as the 
dominant player and sellers are portrayed as price-driven, reactive and reluctant (Graebner and 
Eisenhardt, 2004).  
However, evidence shows that the emphasis on the buyer’s perspective may not always be 
appropriate, particularly when the target is privately- or state-owned. In their studies of acquisitions 
involving private technology firms, Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) found that the seller plays an 
active role in the acquisition process by selecting desirable buyers that offer long-term strategic fit 
and organizational rapport. Similar phenomena were found in acquisitions in Eastern European 
countries (EECs) (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007). Zeng et al (2013) highlighted 
the determinant role played by sellers in acquisitions in China due to the fact that firms are either 
stated owned or not publically traded. Finally, Graebner (2004) found that leaders of the acquired 
firm play critical roles in synergy realization post-acquisition.  
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These empirical findings have provoked scholars to appeal for the development of a seller’s 
perspective on acquisition (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; Zeng et al., 2013). Our focus on the target 
in the context of a transitional economy (e.g. China) allows us to advance this effort and incorporate 
the seller’s perspective when examining acquisition outcomes. Specifically, when a seller plays an 
active role in selecting desirable buyers, the managers and other key stakeholders (e.g. local 
government in China) may be well aware of the sources of potential synergies and likely integration 
initiatives post-acquisition. They may also negotiate for integration initiatives that are beneficial to 
the target in the long run as a condition of sale. For example, it has been shown that in acquisitions in 
EECs, sellers may require buyers to make certain post-acquisition investments in the target 
(Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998, 2000). Additionally, it is likely that stakeholders affected by the 
long-term prospects of the target may work supportively with the acquirer after the acquisition to 
achieve the potential synergies. The above arguments suggest that, in contrast to the negative impacts 
examined in the literature, a target may emerge stronger as a result of acquisition.  
 
Hypothesis development  
Competitive similarity and cost savings at the acquired firm 
According to traditional cost-efficiency theories, HAs can lead to cost savings through the 
achievement of economies of scale and, to a lesser extent, economies of scope. Economies of scale 
are achieved through asset divestitures and eliminating redundant activities and positions (Anand and 
Singh, 1997; Capron, 1999; Tremblay and Tremblay, 1988). Economies of scope are achieved by 
spreading a firm’s resources and fixed costs across a broader product line (Capron, 1999; Lubatkin et 
al., 2001; Teece, 1980).  
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It is likely that all HAs provide an opportunity to capture economies of scale and scope. 
However, there are likely to be more opportunities for cost savings when the acquiring and target 
firms are competitively similar. For example, acquiring and target firms that both place great 
emphasis on marketing and advertising, or both have high degrees of capital intensity, should be more 
likely to find overlapping skills and activities in their workforces or in their fixed assets. Thus, 
management will have an easier time redeploying resources across competitively similar firms, 
reducing operating costs and overhead expenses. Furthermore, from the seller’s perspective, the 
target’s key stakeholders may be more likely to recognize potential synergies and support the 
realization of those synergies when the buyer is competitively similar to the target.  
Hypothesis 1: Competitive similarity will be positively related to post-acquisition 
cost savings at the target. 
 
 
Competitive similarity and revenue enhancement at the acquired firm 
Competitively dissimilar firms target different customer groups or focus on different geographic 
markets. Once the HA is complete, then both units (target and acquirer) should have access to a wider 
array of products (or models), greater marketing resources/knowledge, and different distribution 
networks. Similarly, each unit should be able to reach a wider array of customers. Further, as shown 
in Capron (1999), combining firms focusing on different geographic markets may lead to an 
enhanced innovation capability in the two units. All these factors should lead to opportunities for 
growing revenue at an increased rate. 
Additionally, competitively dissimilar firms (within the same industry) typically place different 
degrees of emphasis on marketing, product development, etc. Barney (1988) and Harrison et al. 
(1991) argue that unique and inimitable synergies are more likely to be developed between firms that 
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are competitively dissimilar and have different resource bases. Furthermore, Capron et al. (2001) 
suggest that resource asymmetries between the acquirer and target facilitate resource redeployment 
and subsequent acquisition performance. Thus, it is more likely that a redeployment of tacit skills and 
organizational knowledge will take place between the acquirer and target when they are 
competitively dissimilar. In doing so, the skill and resource bases of both units should be 
strengthened, likely enhancing growth prospects. Further, from a seller’s perspective, because the 
synergies that can result from combining with a competitively dissimilar acquirer are primarily new 
growth opportunities, various stakeholders of the target will likely benefit from these synergies and 
therefore support the integration process.  
Hypothesis 2: Competitive similarity will be negatively related to post-acquisition 
rates of revenue growth at the target.3 
 
Organizational similarity and the HA integration process 
While competitive similarity affects the magnitude of the potential synergies that may result from an 
acquisition, the degree to which these synergies are eventually realized will depend on organizational 
similarity, referring to the degree to which the acquired and acquiring firms share similar managerial 
approaches and corporate cultures (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Stahl and Voigt, 2008).  
Fully realizing synergies entails significant human interaction and coordination between 
newly-combined units. Organizational dissimilarity, driven by differences in managerial and 
corporate cultures, makes these interactions and coordinated activities more difficult to manage. 
Particularly, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) report that a high need for integration can lead to more 
active resistance by employees of both the acquired and acquiring units. Organizational dissimilarity 
increases mistrust and misunderstanding between managers. Furthermore, studies taking a seller’s 
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perspective have shown that the target’s managers value organizational rapport (Graebner and 
Eisenhardt, 2004). Thus, we expect that organizational similarity will enhance the likelihood that 
synergies will be realized, regardless of whether they involve cost reduction or revenue-enhancing 
activities. 
Hypothesis 3a: Greater competitive similarity will lead to a higher likelihood of cost 
savings at the target when the target and acquirer are organizationally similar.  
Hypothesis 3b: Greater competitive dissimilarity (i.e. less competitive similarity) 
will lead to a higher likelihood of revenue growth at the target when the target and 
acquirer are organizationally similar.  
 
Competitive similarity and profitability improvement 
As evidenced by our first two hypotheses, prior literature suggests that competitive similarity has 
divergent effects on cost savings and revenue growth at the target; a high level of competitive 
similarity may lead to more cost savings, but there will be fewer opportunities for revenue growth. In 
contrast, a low level of competitive similarity may limit opportunities for achieving cost savings, but 
may lead to faster revenue growth. Because both cost savings and revenue growth can lead to 
profitability improvement, the relationship between competitive similarity and profitability 
improvement at the target may depend on whether the combining firms primarily seek cost savings or 
revenue growth. Specifically, a negative relationship between the two will likely be observed when 
the acquisition is mainly driven by revenue growth, whereas a positive relationship will be likely 
when the acquisition is driven by cost savings. Studies of acquisitions involving non-publically 
traded and state-owned firms show that the seller’s decisions about whether to sell and to whom are 
affected by the target’s future growth prospects (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007; 
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Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Given that our research context is China, where the majority of firms 
are either state-owned or not publically traded, we expect that revenue growth is likely to be 
emphasized during the negotiation and integration process (though cost savings may still be pursued 
whenever possible). We therefore hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4: Competitive similarity will be negatively related to post-acquisition 
profitability improvement at the target. 
 
Methodology  
Sample and data sources 
The sample for this study consists of 139 HAs conducted by twenty acquirers in China’s beer industry 
during the period 1999-2006. The beer industry has been frequently used to investigate strategic 
issues (Hatten et al., 1978; Houthoofd and Heene, 1997; Johnson and Thomas, 1987), providing us 
with a rich literature to identify key strategic characteristics in the industry. The number of 
acquisitions conducted by each acquirer in our data ranges from one to 32 (with an average of seven). 
We performed several steps to collect acquisition information. First, we reviewed an Annual 
Industrial Census dataset (hereafter 'census data') provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBSC). This dataset includes annual demographic and financial information of all 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs operating in China with annual sales revenues of 
CNY5,000,000 or greater, and has been used by multiple studies (Chang and Xu, 2008; Park et al., 
2006). We first identified firms that disappeared from the database or changed their names or/and 
ownership types, and then checked these firms’ websites and media reports to determine if the 
changes were caused by an acquisition. Second, we reviewed the annual reports of listed companies 
for information on acquisitions made. Finally, we checked the websites of large unlisted breweries to 
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identify any possible acquisition activities. We obtained demographic and financial information of 
the acquiring and acquired firm from the census data. 
 
Dependent variables 
Cost savings. We considered savings in three major costs of the target firm: (1) savings in the cost of 
goods sold that could be achieved via economies of scale in areas such as procurement and 
production; (2) savings in overhead costs that could be achieved via economies of scale in 
management; (3) savings in marketing expenses (i.e. expenditures related to marketing and 
distributing a firm’s products) that could be achieved via economies of scale in marketing. These 
three types of costs account for 90 per cent of an average firm's sales in our sample.  
We divided each of the three costs by the target’s sales to take consideration of differences in 
firm size. We then calculated the savings in each type of costs by computing the differences between 
two years prior to and two years after the acquisition (e.g. savings in marketing expenses = the 
average of the marketing expenses-to-sales-ratio in the two years prior to the acquisition - the average 
of marketing expenses-to-sales-ratio in the two years after the acquisition). The larger the variable, 
the more cost savings occurred at the target. Using a four-year time window to examine acquisition 
outcomes is consistent with earlier empirical studies (Bruton et al., 1994; Morosini et al., 1998; Zollo 
and Singh, 2004). The year in which the acquisition occurred was excluded because it was impossible 
to pinpoint the exact date on which the acquisition was actually finalized (Meeks and Meeks, 1981; 
Ramaswamy, 1997). 
 
Revenue growth. We measured revenue growth as the percentage increase in the target’s sales in the 
two years after the acquisition from the two years prior to the acquisition (revenue growth = (average 
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sales in the two years after the acquisition – average sales in the two years prior to the 
acquisition)/average sales in the two years prior to the acquisition).  
 
Profitability improvement. We measured profitability improvement by calculating changes in the 
target’s return on assets (ROA) from the two years prior to the acquisition to the two years after the 
acquisition. ROA has been observed as the least sensitive to the upward or downward estimation bias 
that can be induced by changes in leverage or bargaining power resulting from an acquisition (Meeks 
and Meeks, 1981).  
 
Independent variables 
Competitive similarity. Following previous studies, we operationalized competitive similarity using 
similarities in key strategic characteristics of the acquirer and target pre-acquisition (Capron et al., 
2001; Harrison et al., 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Ramaswamy, 1997). We identified six 
strategic characteristics based on studies on strategic similarity and studies on the beer industry. The 
first was marketing intensity. Multiple studies have identified differences in firms’ emphases on 
marketing as an important indicator of differences in their strategies (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990; Ramaswamy, 1997; Swaminathan et al., 2008). Studies on the beer industry have also 
identified marketing expenditure as a key strategic variable (Hatten et al., 1978; Houthoofd and 
Heene, 1997; Johnson and Thomas, 1987). We measured marketing intensity as the ratio of marketing 
expenses to sales. 
The second was the newness of plants. Hatten et al. (1978) identified this variable as a key 
strategic variable in the beer industry and found it to be positively related to breweries’ performance. 
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We measured this variable using the ratio of net value to gross book value of a firm’s fixed assets. The 
third strategic characteristic was the level of a firm’s current assets, such as receivables, cash, and 
inventory. Houthoofd and Heene (1997) noted that a firm’s commitment to inventories, receivables 
and cash is important for a differentiation strategy. We calculated this variable using the ratio of 
current assets to sales.  
The fourth strategic characteristic was investment intensity. Houthoofd and Heene (1997) 
argued that investment intensity has a positive relationship with innovation. Similarly, Johnson and 
Thomas (1987) suggested that capital and investment intensity capture the differentiating production 
or technology characteristics of the beer industry. We divided a firm’s long-term investment by total 
assets to obtain its investment intensity. The fifth strategic characteristic was fixed-assets intensity. 
According to Houthoofd and Heene (1997), this variable may reflect a brewery’s efforts on efficiency 
and search for cost advantages. We measured this variable with the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets to 
total assets.  
The last strategic characteristic was a firm’s geographic market coverage. Overlap in market 
coverage has been repeatedly used to measure strategic similarity between combining firms (Capron, 
1999; Capron et al., 2001; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). In the beer industry, geographic coverage 
has also been identified as a key strategic variable (Hatten et al., 1978; Johnson and Thomas, 1987). 
In China, the industry is highly fragmented; a firm usually serves its local market and adjacent cities, 
owing to high transportation costs and local government protection (Heracleous, 2001; Slocum et al., 
2006). We therefore defined a firm’s market coverage based on the location of its plants. 
Following the literature (Deephouse, 1999; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006; Gimeno and Woo, 
1996), we measured competitive similarity using a synthesized index calculated based on the above 
 strategic characteristics. This approach reflects the integrative nature of strategy and increases model 
parsimony (Deephouse, 1999). We first calculated the Euclidean distance between the acquirer and 
target on these strategic variables and then normalized the distance
subtracted it from one to obtain a competitive similarity measure (Gimeno and Woo, 1996). 
Specifically, the following formula was used:
Competitive similarity =1 -
 
: the  th strategic characteristics 
 
 
For the first five strategic characteristics, the difference between the two firms was calculated 
using their respective values on each strategic variable in the two years prior to the acquisition. We 
standardized each variable before calculating the difference. 
For difference in the acquirer and target’s geographic market coverage, we created an 
ordinary variable based on their locations. In the census data, the location of a firm is coded with a 
6-digit coding system (similar to the zip code system). The first digit represents the region in which 
the firm is located (the mainland of China is divided into six regions: Huabei, Dongbei, Huazhong, 
Huanam, Xibei, and Xinan); the first two digits together represent the province; th
the city (the third digit usually represents the city while the fourth represents a specific district in that 
city); and the fifth and sixth the county. The ordinary variable was coded 1 if the acquirer and target 
have exactly the same location code, 2 if only the first five digits of the two firms' location codes are 
the same, 3 if only the first four digits are the same, 4 if only the first three digits are the same, 5 if 
only the first 2 digits are the same, 6 if only the first digit i
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s the same and the two firms are in 
 
-1 range and 
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neighboring provinces, 7 if the first digit is the same, but the two firms are not in neighboring 
provinces, and 8 otherwise. We also standardized this variable before adding it to the above formula 
for calculating competitive similarity.  
 
Organizational similarity. Similar to competitive similarity, organizational similarity was measured 
using key organizational characteristics of the combining firms prior to the acquisition. Key 
organizational elements that have been identified affecting organizational fit between an acquirer and 
target include organizational culture (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Lubatkin et al., 1999), management 
style/administrative practices (Datta, 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999), and reward and evaluation systems (Datta, 1991). These organizational elements often are 
formed under the influence of the cultural and institutional environments in which a firm is embedded 
(Lau et al., 2002; Ralston et al., 2008; Tsui et al., 2006). We therefore identified four organizational 
variables that may capture organizational differences based on China’s context.  
The first was ownership. In China, firms exist with different ownership structures that 
underlie differences in organizational culture as well as management systems and styles (Child, 2000; 
Tsui et al., 2006). In general, firms can be divided into three major categories based on their 
ownership, namely domestically-owned firms, firms with foreign funds, and firms with funds from 
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Within each category, there are sub-categories of ownership type 
(for example, domestic firms can be divided into state-owned, collectively-owned, etc.). The 
Appendix provides a list of all ownership types and their corresponding code used by the NBSC in the 
annual industrial census. Multiple studies have shown that organizational culture and management 
styles vary across the major ownership types as well as across sub-categories within each major 
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ownership type (Deshpande and Farley, 2000; Ding et al., 1997; Lau et al., 2002; Tsui et al., 2006; 
Wang et al., 2007). 
The second organizational variable was firm age. Tsui et al. (2006) found that organizational 
cultural values are affected by firm age, measured as the number of years since a firm was founded. 
The third organizational variable was the economic development of the province where a firm is 
located. A contextual reality in China is that there are significant regional differences in economic 
development. Lau et al. (2002) found that this regional difference results in differences in employees’ 
predisposition toward change and development culture. Provincial economic development was 
measured using per capita gross domestic product (GDP).  
The fourth organizational variable was employee compensation, which may reflect a firm’s 
reward and evaluation systems. Employee compensation was measured using the total wages and 
benefits of a firm divided by the number of employees of the firm. Information on provincial per 
capita GDP was obtained from various years’ Statistics Year Book of China; information for other 
organizational variables was obtained from the census data.  
Similar to measuring competitive similarity, we measured organizational similarity using a 
synthesized index calculated based on the above organizational characteristics. We first calculated 
the Euclidean distance between acquirer and target on the four organizational strategic variables; we 
then normalized the distance variable to the 0-1 range and subtracted it from one to obtain an 
organizational similarity measure.  
For ownership difference, we created an ordinary variable based on the 3-digit code of 
ownership types listed in the Appendix. The variable equaled 1 if the two firms have exactly the same 
ownership code, 2 if only the first two digits of the ownership code are the same, 3 if only the first 
digit is the same, 4 if one of the two firms is a domestically-owned firm and the other is a firm with 
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funds from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan, and 5 otherwise. We standardized this variable before 
adding it to the calculation of organizational similarity. For differences in firm age, provincial per 
capita GDP, and employee compensation, we standardized these variables and then calculated the 
differences between the two firms in the two years prior to the acquisition.  
 
Control variables 
For all models, we controlled for the target’s prior-acquisition profitability and the relative size of the 
acquired firm with respect to the acquirer. It has been suggested that relative size is positively related 
to synergy potential (Seth, 1990) and realized synergies (Capron, 1999). Additionally, larger and 
better-performing targets may enjoy a higher relative standing in the combined company and a lower 
management departure after the acquisition, reducing detrimental disruptions caused by the 
acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Very et al., 1997). We 
measured a target’s pre-acquisition profitability using its industry-adjusted ROA in the two years 
prior to the acquisition. Relative size was measured as the ratio of the target’s sales to the acquirer’s 
sales two years prior to the acquisition. 
We also controlled for each acquirer’s pre-acquisition profitability, acquisition experience, 
and nationality (i.e. foreign versus domestic). Managers of more profitable acquirers may be more 
confident in their abilities and thus more likely to dominate during the integration process (Hambrick 
and Cannella, 1993). Acquirers’ pre-acquisition profitability was measured using its 
industry-adjusted ROA in the two years prior to the acquisition. Acquirers with greater acquisition 
experience may be more capable of conducting acquisitions and thus perform better (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 1993; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Acquisition experience in an acquirer was measured by the 
number of HAs it had made in the beer industry prior to the focal acquisition. Zeng and Wu (2007) 
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showed that compared to domestic acquirers, foreign acquirers are more likely to select strategically 
similar targets. Therefore, we controlled for the acquirer’s nationality using a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the acquirer is not originally from China and 0 otherwise.  
Finally, we controlled for the year in which an acquisition occurred to take consideration of 
possible macro-level changes that may affect the dependent variables.  
 
Analysis and results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. In order to reduce 
the risk of multicollinearity, we mean-censored the independent and control variables (Aiken and 
West, 1991). The highest variance inflation factor in the models was 1.1, indicating a low threat of 
multicollinearity. Because we have multiple dependent variables that very likely have related errors 
(i.e. integration activities may simultaneously affect costs savings, sales growth and profitability at 
the target), we applied seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), a statistical technique that solves a set 
of regression equations simultaneously and allows for error covariance among the equations (Zellner, 
1962). Since there are five dependent variables in our study (savings in cost of goods sold, savings in 
overhead costs, savings in marketing expenses, revenue growth, and profitability improvement), five 
regressions were run simultaneously at each time. For each dependent variable, the control variables 
were included in Model 1, competitive and organizational similarity were entered in Model 2, and the 
interaction term between competitive and organizational similarity in Model 3 (there is no interaction 
term in the model where target profitability improvement is the dependent variable). 
Table 2 tests the relationships between competitive similarity and the three types of cost 
savings. The dependent variable is savings in cost of goods sold in Panel 1, savings in overhead 
expenses in Panel 2, and savings in marketing expenses in Panel 3. As shown in Model 2 in Panels 1-3, 
competitive similarity has a negative effect on cost savings at the target. These results are inconsistent 
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with Hypothesis 1’s prediction of a positive relationship between competitive similarity and cost 
savings. We will provide possible explanations for these results in the discussion section.  
Model 3 of the three panels in Table 2 tests Hypothesis 3a, which predicts that greater 
competitive similarity will lead to a higher likelihood of cost savings at the target when the target and 
acquirer are organizationally similar. The interaction term between competitive and organizational 
similarity has a significant and positive coefficient in all three panels. Because the main effect of 
competitive similarity is the opposite of our prediction, it is difficult to interpret this interaction effect 
by simply looking at the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term. Following Aiken and West’s 
(1991) suggestion, we plotted the relationship between competitive similarity and the target’s cost 
savings when organizational similarity is at a high (one standard deviation above the mean) and a low 
level (one standard deviation below the mean) in Figures 1-3, in order to gain a better understanding 
of the interaction effect. 
As shown in Figure 1, savings in cost of goods sold increase with the increase of competitive 
similarity when organizational similarity is high, but an opposite relationship applies when 
organizational similarity is low. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern – a positive relationship between 
overhead expenses and competitive similarity when organizational similarity is high and a negative 
relationship when organizational similarity is low. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3a – 
organizational similarity facilitates the realization of cost savings resulting from competitive 
similarity. The patterns in Figure 3, however, do not confirm Hypothesis 3a – there is a negative 
relationship between savings in marketing expenses and competitive similarity regardless of the level 
of organizational similarity.  
Table 3 reports results for the effect that competitive similarity has on the target’s revenue 
growth. Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2, there is a significantly negative relationship 
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between competitive similarity and the target’s sales growth. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 3b, which 
predicts that competitive dissimilarity will lead to a higher likelihood of revenue growth at the target 
when the acquirer and target are organizationally similar. Inconsistent with this prediction, the 
interaction between competitive and organizational similarity is insignificant.  
Table 4 tests the effect of strategic similarity on profitability improvement at the target. 
Consistent with the prediction of H4, competitive similarity has a significant, negative relationship 
with the improvement of the target firm’s post-acquisition ROA.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
This study was intended to enhance our understanding of the impacts that HAs have on target firms in 
China’s context. Drawing on cost-efficiency theories, the resource-based view of the firm, and a 
seller’s perspective on acquisition, we examined how cost savings, revenue growth and profitability 
at the target are simultaneously affected by the two components of strategic similarity, namely 
competitive and organizational similarity. We tested our hypotheses using a unique dataset 
containing information about acquired firms in HAs in China’s beer industry. 
Our results (see Figures 1-3) show that although competitively similar targets and acquirers are 
able to realize minor savings in cost of goods sold and overhead expenses when they are also 
organizationally similar, much greater cost savings occur when both competitive and organizational 
dissimilarity are high. What appears to occur is that steep reductions are made in the target’s spending 
(cost of goods sold, overhead, marketing) when target and acquirer compete differently and have 
different managerial practices and cultures.  
One possible explanation of these findings is that many acquired firms in a transitional economy 
like China are state-owned or formerly-state-owned firms that lack the ability and knowledge to 
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effectively compete as a market entity (Zeng et al., 2013). Significant restructuring of these firms 
after acquisition is often necessary to transfer them into competitive market entities (Meyer and 
Estrin, 2001; Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003). Being acquired by a firm that is both competitively and 
organizationally dissimilar may imply more opportunities for operational restructuring as well as 
management reform, which in turn leads to production and management efficiency at the target. This 
explanation is consistent with the negative relationship between the target’s pre-acquisition 
profitability and cost savings in Table 2, which indicates that cost savings are more likely to occur in 
targets that performed poorly prior to acquisition.  
We also found that combining competitively dissimilar firms led to more opportunities for 
revenue growth at the target. This result supports the stream of literature emphasizing the beneficial 
effects of strategic differences (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
Furthermore, our results show that the realization of this revenue-enhancing synergy does not depend 
on organizational similarity between acquirer and target. This finding is consistent with the notion 
that the realization of revenue-based synergies involves less structural change, a low level of resource 
and activity consolidation, and a high level of autonomy at the target (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Stahl 
and Voigt, 2008; Zaheer et al., 2013). All these integration characteristics reduce the likelihood of 
problems that might arise from organizational differences.  
Finally, consistent with our expectation, targets acquired by competitively dissimilar acquirers 
are found to experience greater post-acquisition profitability improvement. This result may reflect the 
contextual feature that the target's growth prospects are a key determinant of the seller’s decisions 
concerning the acquisition (e.g. whether to sell and to whom) in emerging markets (Antal-Mokos and 
Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007). This contextual feature may lead to an emphasis on achieving 
revenue growth through combining with competitively dissimilar firms.  
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Our study contributes to the literature on Asian business as well as research on acquisitions. First, 
although acquisitions in China have been growing significantly since the 1990s, academic 
investigation of these acquisitions is scarce. The few studies examining acquisitions in China focus 
on either firms’ acquiring/selling strategies (Xu et al, 2010; Zeng et al., 2013; Zou, 2008) or the stock 
market’s reactions to acquisition announcements (Gaur et al., 2013). As a result, little is known about 
acquisition outcomes, and in particular outcomes at the target. Our study therefore enhances the 
literature by comprehensively examining how a target firm may be affected by strategic similarity, a 
factor that has been identified as the most likely predictor of HA outcomes.  
Second, our focus on the target’s post-acquisition operations advances the acquisition literature. 
Although the acquired firm usually becomes a part of the acquiring firm after the acquisition, many of 
its stakeholders continue interacting with it. Understanding acquisition outcomes from the target's 
perspective will not only help the acquirer to better intact with these stakeholders, but could also help 
the target’s stakeholders to make better-informed decisions. Particularly in a context like China, 
where the seller can play an active role in the acquiring and integration process, an understanding of 
how the target will be impacted by the acquisition may not only facilitate the occurrence of an 
acquisition, but could also reduce the acquisition price and integration costs (Graebner, 2004; 
Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004).  
Third, our study also contributes to the acquisition literature by examining cost savings and 
revenue growth at the target simultaneously. This approach allows us to integrate efficiency theories 
and the resource-based view of the firm and helps address the inconsistent views on whether 
combining strategically dissimilar or similar firms is more beneficial (Barney, 1988; Chatterjee, 
1986; Harrison, et al., 1991; Ramaswamy, 1997). Finally, our study enhances our understanding of 
the interaction between competitive and organizational similarity, an area that remains 
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under-explored (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Our findings of the significant interaction effect between 
competitive and organizational similarity on cost savings and the insignificant effect between the two 
on revenue growth indicate that a contingency model is necessary when examining the relationship 
between strategic similarity and acquisition outcomes.  
Our study has important implications for managers. Our findings show that strategic 
dissimilarity is beneficial to the target in China’s context, not only by leading to revenue-enhancing 
synergies, but also by resulting in more cost savings. Additionally, in contrast to the 
well-acknowledged importance of organizational similarity in post-acquisition integration, it seems 
that in a transition economy like China, organizational dissimilarity facilitates the restructuring of the 
target, which in turn leads to cost savings. Therefore, managers should pay special attention to the 
potential benefits of strategic differences when evaluating acquisition targets and factors affecting 
acquisition outcomes. 
Our study is not free of limitations. First, although our measures of competitive and 
organizational similarity were based on key strategic and organizational variables identified in the 
literature, they may not be able to thoroughly capture these concepts given the secondary nature of 
our data. Future studies may use survey or interview methods to obtain a more direct measure of these 
concepts. Second, data availability required that we examine changes in the performance of the target 
firm for two years following the year of its acquisition. It may be that some changes, particularly 
those associated with cost reductions, may take longer than two years to be fully realized. Thus, our 
two-year window may provide only a partially-complete picture of this event. Third, we focused on 
HAs only in China’s beer industry. Although this approach allowed us to avoid complexities that 
could be caused by differences in industries if HAs in multiple industries were used, the 
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generalizability of our results needs to be confirmed by future studies using data from different 
industries.  
 
 
Notes 
1. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) investigated the post-acquisition performance of targets, but 
did not focus exclusively on horizontal acquisitions. 
2. The beneficial outcomes of HA (cost savings, revenue growth, etc.) can occur at either the 
acquiring or acquired firm (or both). However, our study purposely focuses on effects of the HA at 
the acquired firm. This focus is not meant to imply that most or all HA effects occur at the target firm. 
3. We have used the term competitive similarity, as opposed to competitive dissimilarity, in H2 to 
keep the wording consistent across hypotheses. Alternatively, we could have stated this hypothesis 
such that competitive dissimilarity will be positively related to post-acquisition revenue growth at the 
target. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in cost of goods sold at high and low levels of organizational similarity 
  
 
 
Figure 2: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in overhead expenses at high and low levels of organizational similarity 
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Figure 3: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in marketing expenses at high and low levels of organizational 
similarity 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Savings in 
cost of goods 
sold 
            
2 Savings in 
overhead 
expenses 
0.222* 
           
3 Savings in 
marketing 
expenses 
0.019 0.42* 
          
4 Revenue 
growth 
0.153* 0.452* 0.084 
         
5 
Profitability 
improvement  
0.442* 0.475* 0.384* 0.131 
        
6 
Competitive 
similarity  
-0.182* -0.097 -0.147 -0.121 -0.148 
       
7 
organizationa
l similarity 
0.03 -0.232* -0.159 -0.155 -0.013 0.019 
      
8 target 
relative size  
0.039 -0.024 -0.039 -0.003 0.014 0.112 0.126 
     
9 target 
pre-acquisitio
n ROA 
-0.153* -0.283* -0.337* -0.06 -0.408* -0.017 0.158* 0.028 
    
10. acquirer 
pre-acquisitio
0.06 -0.033 -0.065 -0.014 -0.007 -0.307* -0.127 0.014 0.009 
   
 Page 39 of 46  
n ROA 
11 Acquirer's 
Acquisition 
experience  
-0.095 0.172 0.079 0.133 -0.026 0.244 -0.271 -0.148 -0.05 -0.192* 
  
12 Foreign 
acquirer 
-0.119 -0.047 -0.026 -0.109 -0.018 0.207 0.459 0.145 0.11 -0.292* 0.154* 
 
Mean 0.024 0.016 -0.011 0.985 0.001 0.802 0.786 1.764 -0.007 0.023 1.468 0.369 
S.D. 0.119 0.1 0.132 3.897 0.123 0.092 0.119 16.141 0.107 0.054 1.5 0.484 
     * p<0.05; n=139. 
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Table 2: Strategic similarity and cost savings at the target. 
 Page 41 of 46  
  Panel 1 DV: Target cost 
savings – cost of goods 
sold  
Panel 2 DV: Target cost savings – 
overhead expenses  
Panel 3 DV: Target cost savings – 
marketing expenses  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Competitive 
similarity  
 
-0.226 -0.277 
 
-0.118 -0.147 
 
-0.356 -0.400 
 
(0.119)* (0.117)** 
 
(0.063)* (0.061)** 
 
(0.095)*** (0.093)*** 
Organizational 
similarity  
 
0.073 0.040 
 
-0.040 -0.059 
 
-0.105 -0.135 
 
(0.106) (0.103) 
 
(0.056) (0.054) 
 
(0.084) (0.082) 
Competitive 
similarity * 
organizational 
similarity  
  
2.468 
  
1.402 
  
2.159 
  
(0.827)*** 
  
(0.419)*** 
  
(0.685)*** 
Relative size  -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.022 0.018 0.020 0.037 0.029 0.031 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021)* (0.021) (0.020) 
Target’s 
pre-acquisition 
profitability  
-0.173 -0.144 -0.135 -0.212 -0.189 -0.184 -0.442 -0.374 -0.366 
(0.099)* (0.100) (0.097) (0.052)*** (0.053)*** (0.051)*** (0.082)*** (0.080)*** (0.077)*** 
Acquirer’s 
pre-acquisition 
profitability 
0.075 0.030 0.108 0.109 0.065 0.109 0.001 -0.126 -0.058 
(0.219) (0.220) (0.215) (0.115) (0.116) (0.112) (0.181) (0.175) (0.171) 
Acquirer’s 
acquisition 
experience 
-0.012 -0.009 -0.010 0.015 0.013 0.013 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Foreign acquirer -0.022 -0.033 -0.032 0.008 0.010 0.011 -0.000 0.004 0.006 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
Constant 0.035 0.041 0.031 0.049 0.039 0.033 0.043 0.015 0.006 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.028)* (0.029) (0.028) (0.045) (0.045) (0.043) 
Observations 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.096 0.121 0.174 0.197 0.219 0.274 0.204 0.283 0.332 
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*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0; standard errors in parentheses; year dummies included but not shown.
 Page 43 of 46  
Table 3: Strategic similarity and revenue growth at the target. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Competitive 
similarity  
 
-5.923 -6.471 
 
(2.460)** (2.473)*** 
Organizational 
similarity  
 
-1.724 -2.082 
 
(2.177) (2.176) 
Competitive 
similarity * 
organizational 
similarity  
  
26.326 
  
(18.889) 
Relative size  -0.316 -0.462 -0.437 
(0.533) (0.536) (0.532) 
Pre-acquisition 
target profitability  
-1.313 -0.192 -0.091 
(2.062) (2.066) (2.051) 
Acquirer’s 
pre-acquisition 
profitability 
-2.519 -4.630 -3.806 
(4.547) (4.534) (4.539) 
Acquirer’s 
acquisition 
experience 
0.074 0.004 -0.001 
(0.195) (0.209) (0.208) 
Foreign acquirer -0.474 -0.407 -0.388 
(0.483) (0.520) (0.516) 
Constant -0.234 -0.701 -0.810 
(1.117) (1.155) (1.149) 
Observations 139 139 139 
R-squared 0.104 0.143 0.156 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; year  
dummies included but not shown. 
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Table 4: Strategic similarity and profitability improvement at the 
target. 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Competitive 
similarity  
 
-0.229 
 
(0.130)* 
Organizational 
similarity  
 
0.014 
 
(0.115) 
Relative size  -0.020 -0.021 
(0.028) (0.028) 
Pre-acquisition 
target 
profitability  
-0.441 -0.405 
(0.108)*** (0.109)*** 
Acquirer’s 
pre-acquisition 
profitability 
0.026 -0.035 
(0.238) (0.240) 
Acquirer’s 
acquisition 
experience 
-0.005 -0.005 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Foreign acquirer 0.019 0.013 
(0.025) (0.028) 
Constant -0.043 -0.048 
(0.058) (0.061) 
Observations 139 139 
R-squared 0.161 0.180 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; year 
dummies included but not shown. 
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Appendix: Ownership types and codes of firms in China. 
 
Code Ownership of Registration  
 
Domestic enterprises  
110 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Guoyou qiye) 
120 Collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) (Qiti qiye) 
130 Joint-stock cooperative enterprises (Gufen hezuo qiye) 
140 Domestic joint ventures (Lianying qiye) 
141 Joint ventures between SOEs(Guoyou lianying qiye) 
142 Joint ventures between COEs (Jiti lianying qiye) 
143 Joint ventures between SOEs and COEs (Guoyou and jiti lianying qiye) 
149 Other domestic joint ventures (Qita lianying qiye)  
150 Limited-liability enterprises (LLEs) (Youxian ziren gongsi) 
151 State-owned LLEs (Guoyou duzi gongsi) 
159 Other LLEs 
160 Share-holding enterprises (SHEs) (Guofen youxian gongsi) 
170 Privately-owned enterprises (POEs) (Siyou qiye)  
171 Wholly privately-owned enterprises (Siyou duzi qiye) 
172 Private cooperative enterprises(Siying hehuo qiye) 
173 Privately-owned LLEs (Siying youxian zeren gongsi) 
174 Privately-owned SHEs (Siying youxian zeren gongsi) 
190 Other types of enterprises 
 
Enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan 
(HMTEs) 
210 HMTEs in joint-venture format (Gang, Ao, Tai hezi jingying qiye) 
220 HMTEs in cooperative format (Gang, Ao, Tai hezuo jingying qiye) 
230 Wholly-owned HMTEs (Gang, Ao, Tai duzi jingying qiye) 
240 Shareholding HMTEs (Gang, Ao, Tai touzi gufen youxian gongsi) 
 
Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) 
310 Sino-foreign joint ventures (Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye) 
320 Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises (Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye) 
330 Wholly-owned FIEs (Waizi qiye) 
340 Foreign-invested SHEs (Waishang touzi youxian gongsi) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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